Popular Passions are Necessary

LT. COL. Paul Yingling has written a scathing article for the Armed Forces Journal in regards to the failure that he sees in our military, namely our Generals.

America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.

Now I'm not just saying this was a great article because his last name sounds similar to my favorite beer; it's because he is able to lay everything out there for you in a simple manner and be clear about.

The passion of the people is necessary to endure the sacrifices inherent in war. Regardless of the system of government, the people supply the blood and treasure required to prosecute war. The statesman must stir these passions to a level commensurate with the popular sacrifices required.
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The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in applying force to achieve the aims of policy. The general describes both the means necessary for the successful prosecution of war and the ways in which the nation will employ those means. If the policymaker desires ends for which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible for advising the statesman of this incongruence.
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However much it is influenced by passion and probability, war is ultimately an instrument of policy and its conduct is the responsibility of policymakers. War is a social activity undertaken on behalf of the nation; Augustine counsels us that the only purpose of war is to achieve a better peace.
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The most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much reflection that wars of the future will look much like wars of the past. Following World War I, French generals committed this error, assuming that the next war would involve static battles dominated by firepower and fixed fortifications. Throughout the interwar years, French generals raised, equipped, armed and trained the French military to fight the last war. In stark contrast, German generals spent the interwar years attempting to break the stalemate created by firepower and fortifications. They developed a new form of war — the blitzkrieg — that integrated mobility, firepower and decentralized tactics.
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After visualizing the conditions of future combat, the general is responsible for explaining to civilian policymakers the demands of future combat and the risks entailed in failing to meet those demands. Civilian policymakers have neither the expertise nor the inclination to think deeply about strategic probabilities in the distant future. Policymakers, especially elected representatives, face powerful incentives to focus on near-term challenges that are of immediate concern to the public. Generating military capability is the labor of decades.

It may just be me, but this Light Colonel puts it simply the problem we see with today's Generals. I've seen it working at the Pentagon, we have a group of Generals who idolize Patton, this in itself is not a bad thing. The bad thing is they would make Patton sick with the way they care about policy and politics. They idolize a man, they invoke his name, and yet have none of the qualities that made him one of if not our greatest general.

We have generals who do only what this administration tells them, they jump through hoops instead of focused on the job of winning the war and informing the administration what they needed to win this war. General Shinseki had it right at the outset when he testified to Congress that they would need hundreds of thousands of troops to pacify Iraq. Wolfowitz and Rummy took him to task and replaced him as Chief. He understood what the dangers were, but didn't go along with the administration's policy and as such was replaced. This has happened to any officer that didn't agree with the administration and in their place we have yes men who will gladly do what the administration desires.

I have to suggest reading the entire article, it's long but it is very well written and thought out.

This is where the real failure lies in this war in Iraq. We all know we shouldn't be there, except for the 28% who believe Sadaam was BFF with Osama, but the military decisions are being made by men who have no military background. They have no idea what COMBAT is like, and as such think they know best and avoid the PTSD problem that the military currently has.

Army Officer Accuses Generals Of 'Intellectual And Moral Failures'

In the last month we have seen more and more former and active officers coming out against the Army leadership in regards to Iraq. Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, an Iraq vet is the latest to join the fray.

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

An active-duty Army officer is publishing a blistering attack on U.S. generals, saying they have botched the war in Iraq and misled Congress about the situation there.

"America's generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq," charges Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, an Iraq veteran who is deputy commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. "The intellectual and moral failures . . . constitute a crisis in American generals."

Yingling's comments are especially striking because his unit's performance in securing the northwestern Iraqi city of Tall Afar was cited by President Bush in a March 2006 speech and provided the model for the new security plan underway in Baghdad.

He also holds a high profile for a lieutenant colonel: He attended the Army's elite School for Advanced Military Studies and has written for one of the Army's top professional journals, Military Review.

The article, "General Failure," is to be published today in Armed Forces Journal and is posted at http:www.armedforcesjournal.com. Its appearance signals the public emergence of a split inside the military between younger, mid-career officers and the top brass.

Many majors and lieutenant colonels have privately expressed anger and frustration with the performance of Gen. Tommy R. Franks, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno and other top commanders in the war, calling them slow to grasp the realities of the war and overly optimistic in their assessments.

Some younger officers have stated privately that more generals should have been taken to task for their handling of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, news of which broke in 2004. The young officers also note that the Army's elaborate "lessons learned" process does not criticize generals and that no generals in Iraq have been replaced for poor battlefield performance, a contrast to other U.S. wars.

Top Army officials are also worried by the number of captains and majors choosing to leave the service. "We do have attrition in those grade slots above our average," acting Army Secretary Pete Geren noted in congressional testimony this week. In order to curtail the number of captains leaving, he said, the Army is planning a $20,000 bonus for those who agree to stay in, plus choices of where to be posted and other incentives.

Until now, charges of incompetent leadership have not been made as publicly by an Army officer as Yingling does in his article.

"After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, America's general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public," he writes. "For reasons that are not yet clear, America's general officer corps underestimated the strength of the enemy, overestimated the capabilities of Iraq's government and security forces and failed to provide Congress with an accurate assessment of security conditions in Iraq."

Yingling said he decided to write the article after attending Purple Heart and deployment ceremonies for Army soldiers. "I find it hard to look them in the eye," he said in an interview. "Our generals are not worthy of their soldiers."

He said he had made his superiors aware of the article but had not sought permission to publish it. He intends to stay in the Army, he said, noting that he is scheduled in two months to take command of a battalion at Fort Hood, Tex.

The article has been read by about 30 of his peers, Yingling added. "At the level of lieutenant colonel and below, it received almost universal approval," he said.

Retired Marine Col. Jerry Durrant, now working in Iraq as a civilian contractor, agrees that discontent is widespread. "Talk to the junior leaders in the services and ask what they think of their senior leadership, and many will tell you how unhappy they are," he said.

Yingling advocates overhauling the way generals are picked and calls for more involvement by Congress. To replace today's "mild-mannered team players," he writes, Congress should create incentives in the promotion system to "reward adaptation and intellectual achievement."

He does not criticize officers by name; instead, the article refers repeatedly to "America's generals." Yingling said he did this intentionally, in order to focus not on the failings of a few people but rather on systemic problems.

He also recommends that Congress review the performance of senior generals as they retire and exercise its power to retire them at a lower rank if it deems their performance inferior. The threat of such high-profile demotions would restore accountability among top officers, he contends. "As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war," he states.

Political News of the Day

Crooks and Liars is a favorite of mine to go to since they tend to link to everything that one may be interested in when it comes to political news. Yes, they tend to be leaning a tad bit left, but that's okay because I'd rather be leaning a tad left then completely fallen over to the right. At any right they give to us today this clip which has made its rounds over the last week. Apparently it is a speech give to troops who are not going to re-enlist in the Army. I can attest to this, though I wasn't harassed to the level these troops were, and sure as hell wasn't lied to with fear tactics to get me to stay in.

I know recruiters in the military may very well have the toughest non-combat job in the military and this administration isn't making it any easier, but how could you sleep at night knowing full well you're completely lying out your ass? Course there is the other possibility that they actually believe what they were saying, which would be said because then that is precisely why they are still in the military.

LT Ehren Watada is going to Court Martial this week and things are looking to get ugly. He is the highest ranking officer in the military to refuse to go to war. The scariest thing is the military trying to force reporters to testify about what Watada said to them. It's a military trial so they may not have the right to plead the fifth, I'll have to check with Anita on that one. I will keep everyone posted on this as the trial goes forward.

Finally, a great article from the one and only Dave Barry about Miami, the Super Bowl and the shithole that is Denver. My favorite segment of the entire article...

Back in November, Rep. Tancredo, who represents suburban Denver, ruffled some feathers down here when he called Miami ``a third-world country.''

For the record, that charge is unfair: Miami is WAY better armed than any third-world country.


I still hate Denver...I will one day burn it to the ashes and salt the Earth.