Popular Passions are Necessary

LT. COL. Paul Yingling has written a scathing article for the Armed Forces Journal in regards to the failure that he sees in our military, namely our Generals.

America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.

Now I'm not just saying this was a great article because his last name sounds similar to my favorite beer; it's because he is able to lay everything out there for you in a simple manner and be clear about.

The passion of the people is necessary to endure the sacrifices inherent in war. Regardless of the system of government, the people supply the blood and treasure required to prosecute war. The statesman must stir these passions to a level commensurate with the popular sacrifices required.
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The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in applying force to achieve the aims of policy. The general describes both the means necessary for the successful prosecution of war and the ways in which the nation will employ those means. If the policymaker desires ends for which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible for advising the statesman of this incongruence.
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However much it is influenced by passion and probability, war is ultimately an instrument of policy and its conduct is the responsibility of policymakers. War is a social activity undertaken on behalf of the nation; Augustine counsels us that the only purpose of war is to achieve a better peace.
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The most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much reflection that wars of the future will look much like wars of the past. Following World War I, French generals committed this error, assuming that the next war would involve static battles dominated by firepower and fixed fortifications. Throughout the interwar years, French generals raised, equipped, armed and trained the French military to fight the last war. In stark contrast, German generals spent the interwar years attempting to break the stalemate created by firepower and fortifications. They developed a new form of war — the blitzkrieg — that integrated mobility, firepower and decentralized tactics.
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After visualizing the conditions of future combat, the general is responsible for explaining to civilian policymakers the demands of future combat and the risks entailed in failing to meet those demands. Civilian policymakers have neither the expertise nor the inclination to think deeply about strategic probabilities in the distant future. Policymakers, especially elected representatives, face powerful incentives to focus on near-term challenges that are of immediate concern to the public. Generating military capability is the labor of decades.

It may just be me, but this Light Colonel puts it simply the problem we see with today's Generals. I've seen it working at the Pentagon, we have a group of Generals who idolize Patton, this in itself is not a bad thing. The bad thing is they would make Patton sick with the way they care about policy and politics. They idolize a man, they invoke his name, and yet have none of the qualities that made him one of if not our greatest general.

We have generals who do only what this administration tells them, they jump through hoops instead of focused on the job of winning the war and informing the administration what they needed to win this war. General Shinseki had it right at the outset when he testified to Congress that they would need hundreds of thousands of troops to pacify Iraq. Wolfowitz and Rummy took him to task and replaced him as Chief. He understood what the dangers were, but didn't go along with the administration's policy and as such was replaced. This has happened to any officer that didn't agree with the administration and in their place we have yes men who will gladly do what the administration desires.

I have to suggest reading the entire article, it's long but it is very well written and thought out.

This is where the real failure lies in this war in Iraq. We all know we shouldn't be there, except for the 28% who believe Sadaam was BFF with Osama, but the military decisions are being made by men who have no military background. They have no idea what COMBAT is like, and as such think they know best and avoid the PTSD problem that the military currently has.